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ABSTRACT 
The current goal for the United States Navy is to achieve a 355-ship fleet by 2034 
and 500 ships by 2045, according to the March 2020 Report to Congress on the Annual 
Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2020. To achieve this 
goal, ship service lives will need to be extended and shipbuilding will need to occur. 
Given the current budgetary constraint, this project explores the cost effectiveness 
between four approaches to vessel construction: 1) U.S. naval designs built at U.S. yards, 
2) commercial and foreign designs built at U.S. yards, 3) foreign designs built at partner 
foreign yards, and 4) commercial U.S. designs built at foreign yards. The cost 
effectiveness analysis took into account the need to preserve the U.S. naval industrial 
base as well as economic benefits and other advantages and disadvantages of U.S. 
shipbuilding as opposed to foreign shipbuilding for various design types. Based on the 
Constellation Class Frigate design, analysis indicates that the United States produces 
warships at a greater cost than its fellow European NATO member states. The United 
States is also less productive and maintains a lower capacity to produce warships. This 
analysis provides reasonable evidence to shift production of warships overseas, but it 
must be done in a balanced way that maximizes the cost-savings and allows the United 
States to continue to lead the way in next-generation technology.
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As the Navy pushes for a 355-ship fleet by 2034 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
[DCNO], 2019), and a 500-ship fleet by 2045 (Harper, 2020, para. 6), we continue to see 
cost overruns and timeline delays. Our project looks to analyze the four different methods 
of shipbuilding in order to meet the demands of the Navy. We will be focusing on labor, 
materials, and design price differences when building overseas versus domestically and the 
potential savings the Navy can put toward growing our fleet. The domestic shipbuilding 
base contains many flaws and inefficiencies that are highlighted throughout and provide 
comparisons to the commercial market to develop a globally competitive market. A view 
into our NATO allies demonstrates their expertise in shipbuilding and an in-depth look at 
the FREMM class frigate built at a multi-national stage. The domestic market is operating 
beyond capacity in the military sector at the few remaining shipyards and continues to 
make acquisition mistakes that cost the taxpayers billions. Our cost-effectiveness analysis 
will review the acquisition of: 
1. Domestic design built domestically 
2. Foreign design built domestically 
3. Domestic design built overseas 
4. Foreign design built overseas 
The largest contributors to the construction cost (depending on the level of 
technological sophistication) are steel and labor. We identify labor costs by GDP per capita 








A. SHIPBUILDING PROCESS 
The shipbuilding process is similar between both commercial and naval warships 
and consists of four main phases, pre-contract, design, construction, testing, and delivery. 
The U.S. Navy follows the Department of Defense’s defense acquisition system that 
consists of three main sections for needs requirements, funding, and project management. 
These three sections are called the joint capabilities integration and development system 
(JCIDS), the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process (PPBE), and 
acquisition process. These three systems work together to determine the need, design, 
execution, and delivery of a solution as well as ensure funding and timely completion of 
the process within the Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 
2015). Figure 1 illustrates the major milestones and steps within the Navy acquisition 
process. The initial step is the material solution analysis where a physical solution is 
developed for a capability gap or technology discovery. This phase is also where 
requirements are developed and culminates with milestone A and the decision to enter into 
the second phase of technology development. During technology development, initial 
parameters and requirements are finalized, and bidding for contracts take place. This phase 
transitions at milestone B where a contract is signed and the project begins. The next phase 
is engineering and product development where the first prototype and manufacturing 
process is developed. The conclusion of this phase is milestone C where initial operational 
test and evaluation and low-rate initial production occurs. The next phase of production 
and deployment is where full-scale production and deployment of the material solution 
takes place until all scheduled units are completed. This phase often overlaps with the final 
stage of operations and support where completed units are placed into operation and 
maintained throughout their intended lifetime. 
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Figure 1. Navy Acquisition Major Milestones. Source: OSD (2015). 
Each shipbuilding project is unique depending on requirements. Although 
commercial and military shipbuilding projects vary in requirements and procedures there 
are nine basic steps that generally represent a ship’s life cycle. 
1. Development of Owner’s Requirements 
The initial stage of ship production is to determine the requirements desired by the 
customer. These requirements may be broad or narrow but should be designed to meet the 
intended mission of the ship. An example of commercial requirements may be a ship 
capable of transporting 10,000 automobiles a year from Japan to the United States. While 
a military requirement may be an oiler capable of underway replenishment that is capable 
of operating on short notice around the globe. These are examples of broad requirements 
but would be included with more specific requirements to make clear to the manufacturer 
what is expected of the proposed ship (Storch et al., 1995, pp. 2). 
2. Preliminary/Concept Design 
Once requirements for the ship have been determined the basic characteristics of 
the ship are determined. Preliminary designs can be completed by outside design agencies, 
shipyards, or by the owner’s staff. The U.S. Navy differs from commercial shipbuilding 
practice, as it has a large internal shipbuilding design y while domestic U.S. shipbuilding 
tends to hire outside agents to conduct preliminary design. Preliminary design should 
determine parameters that best meet requirements but also work best with the capabilities 
of the shipyard where fabrication will occur. The desired result of preliminary design 
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should meet requirements and enable construction in the most timely and affordable 
fashion.  
The end product of this stage is a general definition of the ship, including 
dimensions, hull form, general arrangement, powering, machinery 
arrangement, mission systems definition (such as cargo capacity and 
handling equipment, combat systems, or habitability), capacities of variable 
weights (such as fuel oil, water, crew, and stores) and preliminary definition 
of major systems (such as structural, piping, electrical, machinery, and 
ventilation [HVAC]). (Storch et al., 1995, pp. 2) 
3. Contract Design 
Following the preliminary design phase, the contract design phase gives enough 
detail and specifics so that firms can bid on the construction of the ship. This means that 
designs should be adequate to allow firms to estimate costs and time required to complete 
the project. Similarly, to the preliminary design, the contract design can be conducted by an 
outside agency, internally, or through a shipyard. It is uncommon for the contract design to 
be conducted internally for both the Navy and commercial firms (Storch et al., 1995, pp. 3). 
4. Bidding/Contracting 
Generally bidding is competitive where firms enter bids based on cost, delivery 
time, and operational requirements. There are instances within both the commercial and 
military sectors where bidding is not competitive and a contract is exclusive. An exclusive 
contract may be the result of a capability only being met by a single firm or if a shipyard 
or firm was hired through the design process (Storch et al., 1995, pp. 4).  
5. Detail Design and Planning 
Upon completion of the contract, a detailed design is created to answer what, where, 
and how, and by whom. This takes into account raw materials, personnel, transportation, 
facilities, budget, and sequencing. Ensuring a detailed and considerate detailed design and 
planning process is crucial to the completion of a ship on time and within budget. The 
greatest contributor to project delay is added work which is a result of inadequate design 
and planning (Storch et al., 1995, pp. 5). 
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6. Construction 
Ship construction can be further broken down into four tiered processes. First, is 
parts manufacturing where raw materials are fabricated into component parts. Second, 
these parts are combined to make subassemblies or units. The third level of assembly is 
where these subassemblies are joined to make hull blocks. Hull blocks are the largest 
components of the ship and are generally fabricated separately. The final stage of 
construction is where the hull blocks are joined to create the completed ship. During this 
final stage, all sections are continuously tested to ensure design requirements are met 
(Storch et al., 1995, pp. 6).  
7. Test and Trials 
Upon completion of construction, the ship is tested to meet requirements. This 
includes dock trials and sea trials where all of the ship’s components are tested within the 
dry dock and then at sea. Testing and trials are more rigorous for initial designs. Once sea 
trials are completed the ship returns to correct any deficiencies identified and to make any 
potential upgrades or design changes (Schank et al., 2014).  
8. Operations and Support 
Once testing and trials have been satisfactorily met the ship is put into operation. 
During the lifespan of the operational ship, it requires maintenance and upgrades. Both 
commercial and military vessels have a planned life cycle of repairs and upkeep. Upkeep 
can range from short periods of maintenance moored in port to extended periods at dry 
dock. Within the Navy, each ship receives a program office responsible for the planning 
and execution of maintenance periods and upgrades until the forecasted retirement of the 
ship (Schank et al., 2014).  
9. Retirement and Disposal 
Upon completion of a ship’s operational life, it is retired or discarded. Within the 
commercial sector, this means it is either sold or dismantled. Within the Navy, this means 
one of three options. Firstly, the ship is either mothballed where it is permanently moored 
or stored in a nonoperational status. Secondly, it could be sold for foreign military sales. 
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Finally, the ship could be dismantled and destroyed collecting component parts with 
remaining value (Schank et al., 2014). 
While the process of constructing a warship and a commercial vessel is similar, 
generally the time needed to complete a warship is significantly longer than that of a 
commercial vessel, particularly when a new class of ship is being developed. For example, 
the DDG 1000 program was initiated in 1993 and the first ship of its class, USS Zumwalt, 
was christened in 2014 but is still not operational or in full production (Downey, 2014). 
This is in contrast to the Oasis Class cruise liner developed by Royal Caribbean 
International that began in 2003 and launched the first ship of the class, Oasis of the Seas, 
in 2009 (Ship Technology, 2020). Although the complexities of a warship differ from those 
of a cruise liner, they are similar in scale and intricacy as the Oasis of the Sea is over ten 
times the size of the USS Zumwalt with an open-air park (Downey, 2014), multi-tiered 
swimming pool, and life-supporting systems for a crew of 5,400 (Ship Technology, 2020). 
This difference in project completion time could be attributed to several aspects ranging 
from differing shipyards, bureaucratic processes, operating requirements, and legal 
restrictions.  
Figure 2 illustrates these phases in three different methods of execution. The life 
cycle of a warship includes a much earlier and longer overlap during the design and 
construction phases that has the potential to result in rework, delays, and cost overruns as 
many recent projects have demonstrated. Commercial acquisition projects tend to follow 
the no-overlap method and result in a fewer rework delays and cost overruns, ensuring all 









Figure 2. Three Ship Design and Build Alternatives. Source: 
Drezner (2011). 
B. DOMESTIC SHIPBUILDING 
The U.S. Navy has released its congressional plan to achieve a 355-ship fleet by 
2034 and maintained through 2049 (DCNO, 2019). There is extensive literature detailed in 
the report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels 
for fiscal year 2020 built through aggressive growth and service life extensions (SLE). The 
articles include cost analysis, delivery plan, and a brief discussion of the shipbuilding 
industrial base. Table 1 illustrates the fleet breakdown and the ships required to meet the 
operational needs of the Navy. 
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Table 1. Navy the Nation Needs. Adapted from DCNO (2019). 
Type Count 
Ballistic Missile Submarines 12 
Aircraft Carriers 12 
Attack Submarines 66 
Guided Missile Submarines 0 
Large Surface Combatants 104 
Small Surface Combatants 52 
Amphibious Warfare Ships 38 
Combat Logistics Force 32 
Command and Support 39 
Total 355 
 
In Tables 2 and 3, Congress details a long-range plan to procure and take delivery 
of ships over the next 24 years to reach and maintain 355 ships, which is first achieved by 
FY34 as demonstrated by Table 5. As new ships are delivered, ships are also being 
decommissioned and removed from the fleet, as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 2. Long-Range Procurement Profile. Adapted from DCNO (2019). 
Fiscal Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 
Aircraft Carrier 1        1    1    1    1    
Large Surface 
Combatant 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
Small Surface 
Combatant 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Attack Submarines 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ballistic Missile 
Submarines 
 1   1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1         
Large Payload 
Submarines 
                1   1   1  
Amphibious Warfare 
Ships 
 1  1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2    1  1 1 1  
Combat Logistics Force 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1          1 
Support Vessels 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1         
Total New Construction 
Plan 12 10 9 13 11 11 11 12 11 11 10 13 12 12 11 9 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 
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Table 3. Battle Force Delivery Plan. Adapted from DCNO (2019). 
Fiscal Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 
Aircraft Carrier     1    1    1     1    1   
Large Surface 
Combatant 4 2 3 2 1 3 2 5 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
Small Surface 
Combatant 2 3 2 5 3 
 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Attack Submarines 3 2 2 3  1 3 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ballistic Missile 
Submarines 
        1   1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Large Payload 
Submarines 
                       1 
Amphibious Warfare 
Ships 
 1  1 1 1 1  1  1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1   1 
Combat Logistics 
Force 
 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1        








Table 4. Battle Force Retirement Plan. Adapted from DCNO (2019). 
Fiscal Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 
Aircraft Carrier     -1 -1  -1     -1     -1   -1  -1  
Large Surface 
Combatant 
 -4 -2  -2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1      -6 -7 -5 -1 -6 -2 -4  -1 
Small Surface 
Combatant -3 
 -2 -6          -1  -1   -3 -1 -1 -2  -2 
Attack Submarines -2 -1 -3 -4 -4 -4 -3 -3 -3 -1 -1  -1   -1   -3 -1 -1 -2  -2 
Cruise Missile 
Submarines 
      -2 -1 -1                
Ballistic Missile 
Submarines 
       -1 -1 -1 -1 -1  -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1    
Amphibious Warfare 
Ships 
       -1  -2 -1 -1 -1  -3 -3 -1 -1 -1  -1  -1 -1 
Combat Logistics 
Force 
 -1  -1 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1        
Support Vessels  -2 -1  -1 -1 -1  -1 -2 -2 -2  -2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 -4 -1  -2  
Total Naval Force 




Table 5. Battle Force Inventory. Adapted from DCNO (2019). 
Fiscal Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
Aircraft Carrier 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 
Large Surface 
Combatant 94 92 93 95 94 95 96 100 102 104 107 110 112 115 117 114 109 107 108 105 105 104 
Small Surface 
Combatant 30 33 33 32 35 35 36 38 41 43 45 47 49 50 52 55 57 58 59 61 62 61 
Attack 
Submarines 52 53 52 51 47 44 44 42 42 44 46 48 49 51 53 54 56 58 57 58 59 59 
SSGNs/Large 
Payload Subs 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 
              
Ballistic Missile 
Submarines 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 12 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 11 
Amphibious 
Warfare Ships 33 34 34 35 36 37 38 37 38 36 36 36 36 38 36 34 35 35 35 37 37 37 
Combat 
Logistics Force 29 30 31 31 32 32 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Support Vessels 34 34 39 41 41 42 43 44 44 44 44 43 44 44 44 45 45 45 44 42 41 41 
Total Naval 
Force Inventory 301 305 311 314 314 313 314 316 322 325 331 337 343 351 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 
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The defense industrial base includes seven private new construction shipyards 
operating beyond capacity by 117–153% (Hooper, 2019) and is far less than our primary 
competitors. Figure 3 illustrates the declining number of domestic shipyards unable to pace 
the required naval force. The commercial shipbuilding industry is hindered by policy 
legislation and lack of government subsidies is at a huge disadvantage compared to 
overseas competitors. There are only three U.S. shipyards currently building ocean-going 
commercial ships to meet the requirements set by the Jones Act (DCNO, 2019). 
15 
 
Figure 3. New Construction Industrial Base. Source: DCNO (2019). 
The domestic shipbuilding and repair industry support 100,000 direct shipyard 
labor jobs and contributes $9.8 billion to the national GDP while being nearly 70% reliant 
on government contracts (Economic Security, 2020). Additionally, for each shipyard job 
created, there are 2.6 jobs created in the associated domestic supplier base, supporting more 
than 400,000 jobs, and $36 billion in GDP (Economic Security, 2020). As of 2015, the 
U.S. ranked 9th in the world with just 0.35% of the world’s gross tonnage of new 
16 
construction with numbers continuing to decline (Klein, 2015). The few remaining 
shipyards shown in Figure 4 lack the scale, technology, and large volume series building 
order books to compete internationally. In the absence of worldwide standards, the United 
States remains handicapped from safety and environmental legislation requiring them to 
bear excess expenditures (Mumma, 1973, pp. 6–7). The industry has an aging workforce 
that is unable to recruit young skilled workers and lacks stability in workload due to 
continuing resolutions.  
 
Figure 4. Major Navy Shipbuilders. Source: Francis (2009). 
U.S. ships built domestically are proven substantially more expensive than those 
manufactured overseas (Frittelli, 2019). Domestic buyers are paying the bill for massive 
subsidies to the shipbuilding sector, limiting the demand for new contracts (Frittelli, 2019). 
Cost growths contribute to the erosion of the Navy’s buying power and delivered ships 
with less capability and lower quality. “Shipyards had so much commercial work during 
the Nixon era that for several years, the Navy could not find enough interested shipbuilders 
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to build all the ships for which funds had been appropriated” (Colton & Huntzinger, 2002, 
p. 13). President Nixon’s Commission on American Shipbuilding then made amendments 
to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to include what is known as the Jones Act (Colton & 
Huntzinger, 2002). The Jones Act is considered protectionist legislation under Section 27 
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which regulates maritime commerce in the United 
States. The act was enacted to stimulate the shipping industry, maintain American political 
strength, and national security in the wake of World War I. “The legislation includes four 
primary requirements on vessels carrying goods between U.S. ports. The vessels must be 
owned by U.S. companies that are controlled by U.S. citizens with at least 75% U.S. 
ownership, at least 75% crewed by U.S. citizens, built (or rebuilt) in the U.S., registered in 
the U.S.” (Transportation Institute, 2019, para. 2). “This build requirement is met when a 
vessel is assembled in the United States and all major components of its hull and 
superstructure are fabricated domestically” (Frittelli, 2019, p. 6). This requirement 
effectively increases the cost of shipping domestically by restricting the number of vessels 
that can legally deliver goods to isolated areas. “U.S. builders of large ships are effectively 
priced out of the world market for merchant ships, the ‘Big Six’ shipbuilders are highly 
profitable, with substantial backlogs extending several years into the new century” (Colton 
& Huntzinger, 2002, p. 22). Limiting the competition to U.S. producers, it limits 
competition and innovation in a global market. On the other hand, international countries 
subsidize their national shipbuilding industries, which the U.S. ceased in 1981, to increase 
capacity (Klein, 2015). Foreign shipbuilding gained the advantage and “U.S. shipbuilding 
companies have no comparative advantage, impossible for the American shipbuilding 
industry to compete” (Klein, 2015, para. 6). 
C. NATO SHIPBUILDING 
By utilizing allied shipbuilders, outsourcing offers several advantages such as 
alleviating workforce shortfalls, reduced construction costs, and reduced need for new 
capital investments (Schank, 2005). A decline in the order of both commercial and military 
ships in the United States is a result of problems meeting the demand from shipyard 
closures and workforce decline. Thus, a need for outsourcing to increase total labor 
capacity has arisen to meet future demands. Cost savings come from reduced overheads, 
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lower wage rates, lower costs associated with workforce fluctuations, and improved quality 
when outsourcing. By moving constructions overseas to more capable shipyards it reduces 
the need to invest in the modification of existing facilities or construction of new facilities. 
This can also be seen through the use of subcontractors which reduces the need for large 
capital investment. 
Trends in European shipbuilding are shifting as once dominant shipbuilding nations 
like Great Britain are taking a backseat in commercial shipbuilding to Asia. The three 
largest shipbuilding nations in terms of tonnage are South Korea, China, and Japan. This 
statistic is somewhat misleading though as Europe and NATO members still maintain a 
significant portion of the shipbuilding market for complex and high-end ship designs such 
as ferries, cruise lines, and military sales. This means that although Asian nations are 
producing a greater tonnage of ships, European nations still receive a much greater return 
on tonnage produced meaning they earn significantly greater amounts per ship than the 
large tonnage freight ships produced in Asia. NATO members have also seen a shift in its 
military shipbuilding. Since the Cold War, NATO members have been building fewer, 
larger, and more complex ships compared to the force structures before the Cold War. 
Shipbuilding is also realigning within NATO as Turkey and Romania have significantly 
increased their shipbuilding sectors in recent years. While most NATO members have strict 
restrictions on military exports, there are only select restrictions in regard to NATO 
member sales to other NATO members (Birkler et al., 2005). Table 6 depicts military 
shipbuilding from 2003 to 2012 within Europe. The graphic illustrates how Germany is the 
largest exporter of military vessels, while the United States and the United Kingdom are 
the largest producers of military ships for domestic use.  
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Table 6. Projected Military Ship Production 2003–2012. Adapted from 
Birkler (2005). 
 Export Domestic Use 








Germany 56 10,713 96,040 21 5,799 44,144 
France 25 6,405 47,570 17 13,015 146,302 
Russia 20 5,000 36,025 0 0 0 
Spain 6 2,035 31,343 7 2,195 26,735 
The 
Netherlands 
9 1,780 8,500 4 1,585 24,759 
United 
Kingdom 
2 650 3,000 22 17,340 235,140 
United States 2 53 174 66 56,172 776,446 
South Korea 1 30 1,500 7 4,905 24,500 
Japan 0 0 0 16 11,090 79,125 
Italy 0 0 0 18 5,289 75,170 
China 0 0 0 8 3,230 26,875 
Australia 0 0 0 1 650 3,051 
Sweden 0 0 0 3 375 1,431 
Taiwan 0 0 0 1 320 2,769 
Israel 0 0 0 11 55 550 
Total 121 26,666 224,152 202 122,020 1,466,997 
Not Reported 23 vessels valued at $13,225 million and displacing 86,291 tons LSW. 
 
Before WWII, the United Kingdom was the dominant shipbuilding nation both 
commercially and militarily in the world. From the 1950s until the present, its commercial 
shipbuilding industry has weakened, and the vast majority of their shipbuilding industry is 
supported by domestic military contracts. “As recently as the early 1980s, U.K. commercial 
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shipbuilding represented up to 3% of the world’s total. This share fell to 0.3% by 2000 and 
has been shrinking further” (Birkler et al., 2005, p. 15). “In 1985, government shipbuilding 
peaked at about 90,000 tons, and again in 1993 at about 120,000 tons. Both of these peaks 
represented about a third of the total U.K. shipbuilding of those years” (Birkler et al., 2005, 
pp. 15–16). The British naval shipyard workforce is highly skilled but aging rapidly and is 
expected to experience severe shortages in skilled labor in the next decade (Birkler et al., 
2005). The three major shipbuilders in the United Kingdom are BAE Systems, Swan 
Hunter, and VT Shipbuilding. These three shipbuilders own or lease 48 facilities capable 
of major naval shipbuilding (Birkler et al., 2005). The British naval shipbuilding industry 
does very few foreign military sales and can experience capacity issues when a facility is 
expected to produce more than one large unit simultaneously.  
Germany is the largest European shipbuilding nation and ranks as the sixth-largest 
shipbuilder globally (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
2016). Although Germany is a significant shipbuilding nation, they only account for about 
one percent of the global market and ship manufacturing accounts for a small portion of 
the nation’s economy. “Nine shipyards and around 400 suppliers are active in German 
naval shipbuilding” (Frank, 2019, para. 5). Germany has conducted the most foreign 
military sales in Europe in the past several decades but has had greater competition from 
Italy and France in the past ten years (OECD, 2016). The vast majority of Germany’s 
foreign military sales are also for submarines and subsurface sensors (Frank, 2019). The 
Thyssenkrupp Group is the largest shipbuilding entity in Germany and is a result of a 2005 
consolidation of Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) in Kiel, HDW-Nobiskrug in 
Rendsburg, Blohm+Voss and Blohm+Voss Repair in Hamburg, Nordseewerke in Emden, 
Kockums in Sweden and Hellenic Shipyards in Greece (Frank, 2019). Thyssenkrupp 
recently made the strategic decision to focus on submarine construction though and has 
plans to sell most of its surface shipbuilding capacity to German Navalyards Kiel who now 
produces the majority of German surface ships, primarily frigates and corvettes.  
With approx. 2,700 employees of the Lürssen Werft group of companies, to 
which the Bremen-based Fr. Lürssen Werft with the Aumund, Berne and 
Lemwerder divisions, the Lürssen-Kröger Werft in Schacht-Audorf (since 
1986), the Neue Jadewerft in Wilhelmshaven (since 2004), the Norderwerft 
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in Hamburg (since 2012), the Wolgast-based Peene-Werft (since 2013) and 
Blohm+Voss (since 2016) belong, has pursued a successful strategy of 
growth and specialized orientation in recent decades. (Frank, 2019, para. 
10) 
“Lürssen is the lead company in the K130 corvette joint venture, which also 
includes Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and German Naval Yards Kiel” (Frank, 2019, 
para. 12). Although Germany maintains a large capacity for shipbuilding, its fragmented 
and restrictive government policy on arms sales have limited the industry’s potential 
(Frank, 2019). 
The Naval Group, formerly DCNS, is the major manufacturer of naval ships in 
France. The group is multinational employing 13,000 employees in 14 countries (Naval 
Group, 2019). The Naval Group, Fincantieri, and the French and Italian governments 
recently signed a cooperation agreement between the two largest naval shipbuilding entities 
in Italy and France. The deal will facilitate cooperation between the two firms on R&D, 
export strategy, and the FREMM multipurpose Frigate project. This alliance coupled with 
the United States’ decision to pursue the FREMM frigate design for its new FFG(X) 
platform will make both France and Italy far more competitive within the European Naval 
Shipbuilding industry (The Maritime Executive, 2020). 
Fincantieri is the dominant naval shipbuilder in Italy and the fourth largest single 
shipbuilding entity in the world after its acquisition of Vard and STX France in 2018 
(Howard, 2015). Fincantieri is the designer and manufacturer of the FREMM class Frigate 
which was the design recently chosen by the United States for the new U.S. FFG(X) Frigate 
Class (Eckstein, 2020). Italy is also the largest producer of ferries, “the twelfth-largest 
producer of merchant shipping in the world (fourth in Europe), and has the third-largest 
European fishing fleet, with the national maritime cluster generating 3% of GDP” 
(Fronseca, 2014, para. 1). The Italian naval shipbuilding industry maintains a large 
production capacity and is capable of supporting the manufacturing of varying ship sizes. 
The Netherlands also supports a shipbuilding industry about the third the size of 
Germany. The Dutch shipbuilding industry suffered severe losses during the 1980s but has 
since recovered to the same level of production as the 1970s. The primary Naval shipbuilder 
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within the Netherlands is Royal Shelde and although the Netherlands produces few warships 
it maintains a significant capability both in expertise and facilities (Birkler et al., 2005). 
D. MATERIAL COSTS 
Numerous cost estimation approaches exist and are utilized in combinations for 
commercial companies and the government to project accurate costs to place appropriate 
bids. The four most utilized approaches, in order from informal to formal, are the black 
book, parametric approach, standard ship approach, and the direct analysis approach. The 
closely guarded black book method taken from experienced cost estimators utilizes 
formulas, tables, charts, industry trends, and vendor data, in which accuracy is difficult to 
confirm. This method is best used for the construction of a single of a few ship types and 
sizes and not so dependable beyond those normally constructed at the yard. The parametric 
approach estimates system and subsystem costs through spreadsheets and cost estimation 
programs with common dimensions and propulsion power compared with similar ships. 
This method is only effective when correlated with similar ships and may not be sufficient 
for many decisions. The standard ship approach utilizes well-known standard ship designs 
to quickly develop bids. This method limits changes and does not often meet customers’ 
requirements. Lastly, the direct analysis approach utilizes drawings, bill of materials, 
vendor costs, and existing quotes but practical only after the late stages of development. 
Combinations of methods may be used, for example, the “parametric approach may be 
used for structure, but the engineering approach may be used for owner-specified engine 
and auxiliary equipment. Cost estimates may be carried out by hand, spreadsheet, or on a 
computer program, and analysis results may be presented at various levels of detail” (Ross, 
2004, p. 99). However, effective cost estimations can be difficult in the early phases of a 
project as information is limited regarding construction costs. 
Improper cost estimations and the costs of materials may dramatically increase 
beyond what was initially planned. Most recently demonstrated in military shipbuilding was 
the material cost growth of the LPD 17, SSN 775, and CVN 76. The “LPD 17 experienced 
over a 100% growth in material costs, 70% of the material cost increases were costs for 
subcontracts to support the design of the lead ship” (Francis, 2005, p. 13). A government 
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contractor’s use of limited or single-source suppliers for extremely specialized and 
distinctive materials have made shipbuilding materials highly susceptible to price gouging. 
Additionally, the “low rate of ship production has affected the stability of the supplier base—
some businesses have closed or merged, leading to reduced competition for the services they 
once produced and that may be a cause of higher prices” (Francis, 2005, p. 15). 
Table 7. Examples of Differences in Material Costs between Types of 
Shipbuilders. Adapted from Deschamps (2009). 
Type Multiplier 
Combatants (Large) 1.210 
Dual-Use Non-combatants (Large) 1.140 
Generic U.S. Modern Commercial (Large) 1.000 
Generic U.S. Modern Commercial (Mid-Size) 1.000 
US Mid-Tiered 1.000 
Northern European (Large) 0.850 
South Korean (Large) 0.720 
 
Depending on the type of contract and type of ship being produced, material cost 
multipliers, demonstrated in Table 7, can affect the overall price. The material multiplier 
results in higher priced goods depending on the type of ship or location of build. “Mil-Spec 
materials are regarded as being of a higher standard, with added shock protection. More 
significantly, vendors and suppliers will increase their prices to cover their added costs to 
provide the usually required military MIL-SPEC documentation on their products. Foreign 
shipbuilders often enjoy lower material prices due to greater backlogs and higher levels of 
purchasing power” (Deschamps & Greenwell, 2009, p. 7). These price differences are 




Table 8. Latest Global Steel Prices. Adapted from MEPS (2020). 
Country Hot Rolled Plate Steel Price (Jan 2020) 
Europe 533 Euros per ton ($626.47) 
USA 740 U.S. dollars per ton 
Nordic 556 Euros per ton ($653.53) 
Asia Prices 587 USD per ton 
 
E. LABOR COSTS 
It is important to find alternative methods for reducing costs as seen by diminishing 
procurement quantities and overall reduced ship numbers affected by annual cost growth 
that exceeds the rate of inflation. 
Table 9. Labor as Percentage of End Cost by Ship Type. Adapted from 
Arena (2006). 
Ship Type Labor % of End Cost 
Nuclear aircraft carrier 51 
Amphibious ship 47 
Attack submarine 39 
Surface combatant 32 
 
“It is generally accepted that the cost of labor reaches half the construction cost of 
the vessel’s hull, depending on the complexity and type of vessel” (Leal, 2017, p. 4). As 
demonstrated by Table 9, warship labor costs contribute to a significant portion of the end 
cost and an area that would benefit significantly from reduced labor rates. The construction 
of a warship “steel hull, the costs are divided into ¼ for the material (steel) purchase and 
¾ in labor” (Leal, 2017, p. 4). 
Labor hour increases from design changes and lack of skilled labor for the eight 
case study ships demonstrated in the GAO investigation “ranged from 33 to 105%, for a 
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total of 34 million extra labor hours and $1.3 billion” (Francis, 2005, p. 11). “Shipbuilders 
for the LPD 17 and CVN 76 each needed 8 million additional labor hours,” with the LPD 
17 reaching an additional $284 million” (Francis, 2005, p. 11). While the “labor cost as a 
percent of total cost growth was the greatest for DDG 91 that amounted to 105%” (Francis, 
2005, p. 11). With the diminishing shipbuilding industrial base, a lack of skilled workers 
to complete the complex tasks, and the experience required to efficiently carry them out 
has driven the price of labor hour costs. Additionally, material delivery delays contributed 
to the increase in labor expenses resulting in increased final costs and deadline extensions.  
Table 10. Relative Labor Costs Based on GDP per Capita. Adapted from The 
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (2012); Country Economy (2020). 
Countries Population Annual GDP (M$) GDP/ capita ($) GDP/ Hour ($/hour) 
Romania 19,317,984 250,026 12,943 6.222596154 
Italy 60,244,639 2,001,290 33,219 15.97067308 
France 67,098,824 2,715,580 40,471 19.45721154 
United 
Kingdom 67,025,542 2,824,850 42,146 20.2625 
Germany 83,166,711 3,845,718 46,241 22.23125 
Netherlands 17,407,585 907,072 52,108 25.05192308 
United States 327,352,000 21,433,200 65,458 31.47019231 
 
Table 10 depicts the major European shipbuilding nations ordered from lowest to 
highest based on GDP per capita. GDP is a measure of the value of goods and services 
produced in a country. GDP per capita is a measure of GDP per the population within a 
country, giving a measure of a country’s economic prosperity. The Office of Personnel 
Management estimates that the average number of hours worked by full-time employees 
annually is 2,080 hours per year. By dividing GDP per capita by 2,080 hours, GDP per 
hour can be determined to compare the cost of labor between each NATO nation. Table 10 
shows that among the leading NATO shipbuilding nations, labor is most costly in the 
United States and least expensive in Romania. It shows that labor in Italy is nearly half as 
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costly as the United States with a GDP per hour value of about $16.00/hour compared to 
the United States with a GDP per hour of about $31.50/hour. The data also shows that 
nations like Germany and the Netherlands have GDP per hour more closely valued to that 
of The United States with GDP per hour values of $22.23/hour and $25.05/hour 
respectively. This data shows that labor costs between The United Kingdom, Germany, 
and the Netherlands are fairly comparable. It also shows the labor from Italy and Romania 
is significantly less costly than that of the other NATO nations. Finally, this data shows 
that labor from any NATO ally should be less costly than that of the United States.  
F. SHIP DESIGN AND MODULARITY 
There is extensive research on the benefits of modular ship design to save costs and 
time through various methods. Analyzing modular outfitting concepts are utilized in 
today’s shipyards, with the goal of optimizing the shipbuilding production process while 
decreasing costs and increasing competitiveness without utilizing large sums of capital 
investments. The differing methods in shipbuilding by the commercial and governmental 
sectors have led to a declining base negatively affecting the ability of the Navy to reach 
demands. Many problems within the Navy stem from the early stages of development and 
contracting resulting in long-term consequences. 
Within the commercial shipbuilding industry, delivering products promptly and 
within budget is imperative. To do so, they ensure all aspects of design are executed as 
planned and don’t begin until all critical milestones, product model, and knowledge is 
attained. A full understanding of the effort needed to design and construct the ship is 
reached before signing a contract, to enable the shipbuilder to agree on fixed prices, 
delivery date, and performance parameters. To best minimize risk, designers reuse previous 
designs to the best extent possible and utilize mature technologies. To ensure a clear line 
of communication and expectation, buyers maintain a presence throughout the shipbuilding 
process and that the ship meets quality expectations. The commercial model succeeds due 
to its discipline in maintaining profitability.  
The Navy would greatly benefit from the use of these practices as they are over-
ambitious with requirements and developmental equipment unable to meet the needed 
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capacity. It is common practice within naval shipbuilding to start construction before 
finalization of designs and changes due to experimental technology led to compounding 
consequences of out of sequence work and rework. Experimental technology requires a full 
understanding of the design and typically results in cost and time overruns, which must be 
negotiated within the contract. The Navy takes on almost all of the financial risk by 
utilizing cost-reimbursable contracts rather than fixed-prices. These inflated costs of 
building naval vessels under a constrained budget result in fewer ships and higher long 
term operating expenses. The Navy’s continued habit of introducing new technologies at 
limited volumes, disregarding shipyard competition, and obtaining insufficient expertise 
has produced high-risk practices (Francis, 2009). 
Part of the construction design includes non-recurring engineering (NRE) which is 
a one-time cost to develop, design, or manufacture a new product that includes setup costs. 
The non-recurring costs, for example in Figure 5, may also include research, preliminary 
and contract design, detail production engineering, and production planning. These 
expenses can be distributed throughout the contract for each acquired ship but are typically 
recognized in the lead ship cost. Within the government ship acquisition contracts, which 
include non-recurring costs, they are generally higher than for commercial ship programs. 
“Combatant surface vessels incur even higher non-recurring costs between 100% to 200%, 
depending on the complexity of the ship design and the number of ships being built that 
necessitates more engineering efforts to improve down-stream construction costs and 
delivery schedules” (Deschamps & Greenwell, 2009, p. 15). 
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Figure 5. Work Breakdown of Non-Recurring Cost Efforts. Source: 
Deschamps (2009). 
Table 11 portrays the emphasis on the importance of a proper and mature design 
before construction beginning. “It is estimated that early-stage design decisions drive 75% 
or more of ship construction and life cycle cost, so design for maintenance and other 
energy-efficient design initiatives can significantly reduce the cradle to grave cost impacts 
to ship owners” (Dlugokecki & Hepinstall, 2014, p. 31).  
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Table 11. Building Stage’s Impact on Total Cost. Adapted from Michalski 
(2004). 
Building stage Cost of the stage Impact on total building costs 
Preliminary design 3% 60% 
Other design stages 7% 25% 
Ship production 90% 15% 
 
As a design project progresses and more cost information is gathered, contractors’ 
uncertainty of estimates decreases.  
The estimation shows that the design stage, having itself approximately 10 
% share in the total building costs, determines 85 % of those costs. Expenses 
on the design quality—proper choice of the ship’s main parameters, 
production technology, structural materials, equipment types etc.—have a 
significant impact both on the shipyard’s and owner’s economic effects. 
(Michalski, 2004)  
By utilizing mature technology and designs, ship manufacturers would be able to 
cut costs as most of the cost risk is set at the overall acquisition.  
If the modularization of shipbuilding can be adopted by the military, there is room 
for cost savings while also maintaining national security. Figure 6 demonstrates those 
potential cost savings to capitalize on specialization and overlapping manufacturing 




Figure 6. Potential Cost Savings from Extended Modularization. Source: 
Deschamps (2009). 
G. TARIFFS AND EXPORT COSTS 
In general tariffs and export costs are transitory and minor in scale with nations 
imposing equal retaliatory taxes and fees negating the difference in cost between nations. 
There are three major exceptions to this rule regarding to steel and aluminum tariffs over 
the past twenty years. These exceptions include the 2002 United States Steel Tariff, and 
the 2018 and 2020 Trump Administration National Security Tariffs. For the purposes of 
our analysis, tariffs and export costs will be ignored due to the shifting and retaliatory 
nature of the imposed taxes, but these three exceptions will be addressed for awareness.  
In March of 2002, The United States imposed steel tariffs ranging from 8%–30% 
on all steel imports (Tran, 2003). These tariffs were in response to a group of analyses that 
determined the U.S. steel industry was suffering due to an increase in steel imports. The 
only two nations initially excluded were Canada and Mexico and the measures were 
intended to remain in place until 2005 (Tran, 2003). These tariffs were met with strong 
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international condemnation particularly from NATO and EU member states and were 
eventually found unlawful by the World Trade Organization and lifted in December of 
2003(Becker, 2003). 
In June 2018, the United States imposed a global tariff of 25% on steel and 10% on 
aluminum (Wollenhaupt, 2020). These tariffs were imposed under section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (Republican Policy Committee, 2018). These tariffs remain in place 
as of October 2020 as negotiations with NATO states continue. While these tariffs were 
imposed to strengthen The United States’ industrial base and production capability it is 
unclear if these tariffs have improved or harmed U.S. shipbuilding capability 
(Wollenhaupt, 2020). An analysis from the Brookings Institute found that there was little 
way to determine the benefits of these tariffs and stated,  
These tariffs antagonized many of America’s closest security partners, 
particularly Canada, which undermined efforts to cultivate a broader 
multilateral alliance to challenge China. Moreover, the Trump 
administration’s frequent resources to national security on flimsy grounds 
will make it more difficult for the U.S. to push back when other countries 
cloak protectionism in tenuous appeals to national security. (Gertz, 2020, 
para. 11) 
This analysis also illustrated that whatever benefits garnered for U.S. aluminum 
and steel production was met with increased cost for shipbuilders and decreases in exports 
due to retaliatory tariffs from foreign nations (Gertz, 2020). 
Steel makes up the majority of hull materials but depending on ship class and 
design, naval vessels can use a substantial amount of aluminum. In August 2020, The 
United States re-imposed a 10% tariff on Canadian aluminum products after negotiating a 
cease to the 25% steel and 10% aluminum tariffs imposed by the United States in 2018. 
Canada responded by placing an equal tariff of 10% on all United States aluminum 
products (Bown, 2020). Although the United States, Mexico, Canada Agreement, 
USMCA, had attempted to resolve aluminum trade disputes within North America this 
recent action has driven the price of aluminum has risen 88% from April 11, 2020, to 
September 28, 2020 (Business Insider, 2020). 
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H. SHIPBUILDING PRODUCTIVITY 
For the last several decades, the standard for shipbuilding productivity has been 
compensated gross tonnage. Compensated gross tonnage measures the amount of work 
necessary to complete a vessel of a certain tonnage. By introducing coefficients to account 
for differing gross tonnage and complexity between vessel types, the compensated gross 
tonnage system can be used to compare shipbuilding regions and even nations. While there 
are shortfalls related to this system to include a lack of consideration of the total efficiency 
of a shipyard such as contractor services, management, marketing, planning, etc., the 
system remains the standard for comparison. Based on the CGT system of comparison the 
United States has lagged behind European NATO members in regard to shipyard 
efficiency. A 1998 study conducted by The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies found that 
the United States’ shipyards were 40% as productive as European shipbuilding 
counterparts (Hammon & Swetnam, 1998). This trend in poor U.S. performance was 
echoed by a 2009 productivity analysis conducted by Croatian shipyard Brodosplit that 
found that the United States’ shipyards were one-fifth as productive as Western European 
shipyards (Cagalj, 2009). Many factors contribute to productivity, but the factors can be 
broken into two categories: those that affect the input and those that affect the output. The 
factors that affect the input and contribute most to productivity are management, 
shipbuilding methods, logistic capability, level of automation, a ratio of production 
employees to non-production employees, shipyard organization, level of technology within 
the shipyard, employee expertise and training, and amount of employee absence and 
working discipline (Cagalj, 2009). Changes in ship design and technologies incorporated 
within ships will affect the output segment of productivity. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we will consider the United States’ productivity as being 40% that of European 
NATO nations.  
I. GAPS 
There are gaps in research that exclude information regarding impacts to the 
economy and the costs saved and lost by moving shipbuilding overseas to a NATO ally 
due to the restrictions in place by the Jones Act. The costs saved by switching to a modular 
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platform and quantifying the benefits of different ship designs whether foreign or domestic 
and at varying locations require more research. Utilizing the cost estimates of designing 
ships we will calculate the location variation costs coupled with the shipyards to pick the 
most cost-effective method. Comparing costs attributed to the platform design as well as 
domestic and overseas shipyard production will be the scope of further research.  
34 





The methodological approach for this analysis will be to conduct a cost-
effectiveness analysis of constructing warships within The United States or European 
NATO partner’s shipyards. The use of a procured NATO partner’s design or a domestic 
United States design will also be compared. The areas of comparison will be quantitative 
data such as material costs, labor costs, shipyard productivity, and other intangible 
influences on cost-effectiveness through qualitative data. The French and Italian 
Fincantieri, FREMM, class frigate will be the vessel of comparison and it will be assumed 
that this design is almost exactly similar to the Constellation class U.S. frigate program 
procured from Fincantieri.  
The limitation imposed by COVID-19 and the closure of NPS and school facilities 
severely restricted research to online resources. We focused heavily on the most significant 
expenses in modern shipbuilding which are labor and steel. The single source of steel prices 
as of January 2020 through the MEPS database by geographic locations is at the base of 
our material analysis. Information on the wages within the international shipbuilding 
industry is scarce, which led to the utilization of GDP per capita divided by the average 
yearly hours worked to produce the productivity and labor rate. The forecast of lost GDP 
was simplified to disregard possible cascading effects as they become increasingly 
unquantifiable and that those jobs lost will not remain.  
The United States Department of Defense estimates that the Constellation (FFG-
62) Class frigate program will cost $1.3 billion for the first ship, $1.1 billion for the second 
ship, and $940 million for each subsequent ship in 2021 dollars. The Congressional 
Budgetary Office also conducted a cost estimate of the program and determined an average 
cost of follow-on units to be $1.2 billion per unit (O’Rourke, 2020). The FREMM class 
frigates being produced in France cost approximately $790,500,000 per unit (Gautier, 
2014). These figures will be used in our analysis comparison to determine the overall cost-
effectiveness of manufacturing warships in the United States or Europe. Known data from 
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the manufacturing of the FREMM within the United States and Europe will be compared 
with expected costs derived from materials, labor, productivity, and other intangibles. 
Using the FREMM frigate program as the class of ship for comparison will allow for 
consistent analysis with actual cost differences.  
To compare the actual cost of the FREMM program to our anticipated cost based 
on shipbuilding location and design origin we will use percentages of overall fixed cost 
from a cost estimation model from SPAR Associates, a shipbuilding planning and 
production management firm based out of Annapolis, Maryland. Based on the cost 
estimation data from a 150-meter offshore patrol vessel, we will consider materials to 
account for 43% of the total cost, labor will account for 20% of the total cost, and non-
recurring engineering will account for 15% of the total cost.  
Table 12. 150m Off-Shore Patrol Vessel Cost Breakdown. Adapted from 
Deschamps (2009). 
 
Labor Material Non-Recurring 
Engineering 
Total Cost 
Cost ($) $129,393,147 $275,344,361 $98,557,676 $641,299,563 
Percentage of Total (%) 20.18% 42.94% 15.37% 100% 
 
B. DOMESTIC DESIGN BUILT DOMESTICALLY 
1. Material Cost Differentiation 
Within the production of ships, steel and labor stand out as the highest cost 
contributors of a final product. According to MEPS, the leading international steel market 
analysis company, the United States maintains the highest prices per ton of steel as shown 
in Table 8. At $740 per ton as of January 2020, the United States. was 18.12%, 13.23%, 
and 26.06% more expensive than our European, Nordic, and Asian counterparts, 
respectively. With steel being a huge resource required for ship construction, the United 
States is spending a far higher amount on materials. This, coupled with the cost multiplier 
of combatant ship materials as demonstrated by Deschamps, the U.S. has the potential for 
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large cost savings of building overseas. Because the Navy tends to be a single-source 
contractor for materials, they are vulnerable to price gouging, further increasing the price 
of materials. 
2. Labor Cost Differentiation 
The U.S. also maintains one of the highest costs of productivity at $31.47 per hour 
as shown in Table 10. This is 25.63%, 41.56%, 55.33%, 61.72%, 97.06%, and 405.95% 
higher than in the Netherlands, Germany, U.K., France, Italy, and Romania, respectively. 
The minimum wage and the demand for skilled laborers have driven up the price per labor 
hour. By keeping the military shipbuilding sector domestic, of which is 70% reliant on 
government contracts, the 100,000 direct shipyard labor jobs and the annual $9.8 billion 
contributed to the GDP would be secure in supporting the U.S. economy (Economic 
Security, 2020). 
a. Shipyard Capacity 
The U.S. industry of new construction shipyards is operating beyond capacity by 
117–153% and is unable to keep up with the current need (Hooper, 2019). The number of 
lost contracts due to the limited capacity of the seven current shipyards has driven potential 
GDP to other countries and allows those company’s full control of the prices charged. The 
Navy’s need to maintain ship numbers through the service life extension program (SLEP) 
and neglecting vital yard cycles have led to higher costs in the long run. Additionally, 
constant cost overruns and missed deadlines demonstrate the need for the U.S. to shift 
production overseas.  
C. FOREIGN DESIGN BUILT DOMESTICALLY 
1. Material Cost Differentiation 
As demonstrated in the previous section, steel prices will be significantly more 
when built within the U.S. and exponentially increasing the overall costs. The Navy 
contractors will still utilize the same practices and consist of single-source suppliers that 
further drive up the price of materials. 
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2. Labor Cost Differentiation 
The U.S. maintains one of the highest costs of labor over those countries considered 
to outsource to, regardless of the ship design.  
3. Procured Ship Design 
Potential cost savings of procuring a tested and mature foreign design can eliminate 
a large portion of required R&D. Such an example is seen in the procurement of the new 
Fincantieri frigate design based on the mature FREMM currently utilized by the French, 
Italian, Moroccan, and Egyptian navies, as a parent-design approach. “Using the parent-
design approach can reduce design time, design cost, and cost, schedule, and technical risk 
in building the ship” (O’Rourke, 2020, p. 9). As previously discussed, a finalized design 
and a complete understanding of requirements that account for 10% of the total costs lead 
to on-time deliveries and lower production costs determining 85% of those costs 
(Michalski, 2004). A mature design that has been produced numerous times overseas and 
partnered construction leads to a reduction in learning curve costs. This reduction is cost 
ranges between 80% and 85% in the shipbuilding sector, meaning a reduction in cost 
between 15% and 20% with every doubling of production, demonstrated by Figure 7 (Sokri 
& Ghanmi, 2017). “As operations become more labor-intensive, learning rate increases. 
Operations that are fully automated have almost no learning, while operations that are 
entirely manual labor tend to have learning rates around 70%” (Lee, 2014, p. 47). 
39 
 
Figure 7. Learning Curve Example. Source: Sokri, (2017). 
By utilizing a mature FREMM design the U.S. would be able to capitalize on the 
European learning curve after the production of 20 units and immediately be able to reduce 
the relative cost with the aid of European advisors. The percent savings on relative costs 
can be seen in Figure 7 as the number of units produced double, the costs are reduced by 
the learning percentage. The shipbuilding industry realizing an approximate 80–85% 
learning rate after the 20th unit would see about a 50% reduction in relative costs. 
D. DOMESTIC DESIGN BUILT OVERSEAS 
1. Material Cost Differentiation 
European NATO nations enjoy a significantly lower cost for steel. Based on 
January 2020 estimates from MEPS, steel price in European nations is $626.47 per ton as 
opposed to $740 per ton in the United States. That equates to 15.34% cheaper steel when 
manufactured in European NATO nations when compared to the United States. Although 
steel is not the only material used in the manufacturing of ships it makes up the majority 
of material cost in the manufacturing process.  
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2. Labor Cost Differentiation 
Labor within European NATO nations is consistently lower than in the United 
States. The average GDP per hour of labor for European NATO nations was $18.20/hour 
in 2019 while The United States’ GDP per hour of labor was $31.50/hour. Labor cost 
within European nations varies with Romania having the lowest labor rate of $6.22/hour 
and the Netherlands has a labor rate of $25.05/hour. This difference in labor cost is 
significant and would lead to equal levels of labor in any of the European nations being 
significantly less costly than in The United States. While the cost of manufacturing a 
United States warship in Europe would also cost The United States significant earnings 
and jobs, weakening an industry already dependent on military contracts.   
a. Shipyard Capacity 
Major European shipyards consistently maintain capacity for more projects and 
could alter build schedules to meet contracts for the United States. European specialization 
in ferries and cruise ships has enabled major shipyards to maintain both military and 
domestic build capacity strengthening the industry. Joint projects and collaboration like the 
FREMM frigate program between the French and Italians enable greater overall capacity 
between the major European NATO shipyards (Kulkarni, 2015). Increased shipyard 
capacity means more contracts can be accomplished at more competitive rates. Although 
European shipyards maintain greater shipyard capacity than the United States, it is unclear 
how an influx of United States contracts would affect European capacity.  
b. Productivity 
Productivity within European shipyards has been significantly greater than their 
United States counterparts. United States shipyards achieve only 40% of the productivity of 
European NATO nation shipyards. This increased productivity will mean that a ship built in 
Europe will not only be cheaper but completed more quickly than one built-in the United 
States. Quicker builds will also mean greater capacity within the shipyards. Although 
European nations hold a significant advantage compared to United States productivity, 
shifting production from U.S. shipyards to Europe would mean even less experience for U.S. 
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workers in a field that has been found to require around eight years of experience to learn the 
requisite skills and specialization to be 90% efficient (Kulkarni, 2015). 
E. FOREIGN DESIGN BUILT OVERSEAS 
While most of the criteria analyzed from a U.S. design built overseas there will be 
a significant shift for costs associated with design and research and development when 
using a NATO partner design built overseas. As demonstrated with the United States’ 
procurement of Fincantieri’s FREMM frigate program, using a tested ship design can save 
on research and development as well as improve cost saving through the commonality of 
parts and equipment and manufacturing. Using proven, procured designs reduces 
construction time by 10% (Michalski, 2004). Design and development as well as on-time 
delivery accounts for 85% of overall cost and with a robust proven design that reduces the 
risk of delay (Michalski, 2004). 
Table 13. FREMM Comparison U.S.  versus European Design and 
Manufacture 
 
Labor Material Non-Recurring Engineering Total Cost 
Percent 
Savings 
U.S. Build with U.S. 
Design $241,479,605 $403,592,509 $401,286,790 $1,196,823,545 00.00% 
U.S. Build with 
European Design $189,661,065 $403,592,509 $144,463,244 $940,000,000 21.46% 
European Build with 
European Design $159,496,885 $339,404,126 $121,487,441 $790,500,000 33.95% 
European Build with 
U.S. Design $143,318,855 $339,404,126 $41,305,730 $710,318,289 40.65% 
 
Table 13 illustrates the cost breakdown based on SPAR cost estimation for a similar 
vessel. This table illustrates that U.S. labor is 40% more expensive than European labor. 
This table also illustrates that U.S. materials are 16% more expensive than European’s. 
Finally, both scenarios where a design is procured from outside the manufacturing region 
show significant cost savings. This data is fairly consistent when compared with our 
previous analysis of labor and material differences between Europe and the United States. 
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An analysis earlier in this report found that European steel, the most significant material in 
warship manufacturing, was around 15% cheaper than steel procured in the U.S. This 
figure is quite similar to the 16% difference found in the analysis of the real world FREMM 
case. Analysis from prior in this report found that labor within the United States would be 
38% more expensive than French labor. This figure is also similar to the 40% difference in 
labor cost found from the FREMM case study. Finally, the cost savings column shows the 
percent difference based on the overall cost of a U.S. designed ship built domestically. The 
difference between a ship built from European design in Europe compared to a ship built 
from United States’ design in Europe does not reflect how much the United States would 
pay for either ship as the data is based on the cost of a FREMM frigate the French are 
paying to build from a European design for use in France. This percent difference of about 
7% does appear to illustrate how much less research and development would cost when 
compared with a ship designed in the U.S. as the difference between a ship built in the U.S. 
with a U.S. design compared to a ship built in the U.S. of European design is about 21% 
more expensive when using a U.S. design.  
Based on our analysis, the shifting of production overseas would see significant 
cost savings; however, this would adversely affect the U.S. manufacturing market and 
GDP. Shifting the production overseas would result in a decline in U.S. GDP for an 
industry that produces $9.8 billion, of which 70% are government contracts. Shifting 
warship production overseas would see an approximate $6.86 billion reduction of the 
$21,433,200,000,000 GDP. This reduction in GDP would not be realized for long as people 
shift occupations and shipyards pick up new contracts. This would potentially help the 
commercial industry to combat the restrictions imposed by the Jones Act and the increased 




A joint venture is currently being undertaken with the F-35 program and can be 
compared to a possible future project with the FREMM frigate. The F-35 Lightning II is 
the United States’ fifth generation fighter aircraft program developed by Lockheed Martin 
(Lockheed Martin, 2020). Three variations of the aircraft were developed for use by the 
United States Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy (Lorell & Kennedy, 2013). Australia, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Norway, Turkey, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom are all nations currently producing component parts for the F-35 as well as 
purchasing the platform (Lockheed Martin, 2020). Israel, The Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Belgium, and Poland are also slated to purchase the platform from foreign 
military sales (Lockheed Martin, 2020). There are also two final assemblies and check out 
manufacturing facilities in Italy and Japan (Lockheed Martin, 2020). This network of 
partnering nations accounts for 46% of the global economy making the F-35 one of the 
most significant mutual trade and defense programs in history (Foreign policy). The F-35 
program sought to reduce life cycle cost by consolidating research, development, test, and 
evaluation for all three variants (Lorell & Kennedy, 2013). The program also seeks to 
reduce life cycle cost through international cooperation, and shared manufacturing and 
maintenance production. Foreign partnership and sales also improve economies of scale in 
procurement and operations as well as support, reducing the overall cost of the program 
(Lorell & Kennedy, 2013). This reduction in cost can already be seen in the F-35’s low-
rate initial production where LRIP Lot 12 cost a total of $6 billion for 255 aircraft (Tadjeh, 
2019). The United States accounted for $3.5 billion and international partners accounted 
for $2.5 billion of the $6 billion total (Tadjeh, 2019). This example illustrates the cost-
saving potential for foreign partnerships. The F-35 program also serves as an example of 
how international cooperation with military programs can improve interoperability, 
streamline the supply chain, and reduce overall sustainment costs. All of the core partners 
of the program produce component parts for the entire program not just for the nation 
producing the parts (Lockheed Martin, 2020). The widespread use of the platform also 
makes interoperability more feasible with foreign nations as sensors and communications 
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equipment is shared making joint exercises and engagements more effective. Finally, the 
F-35 serves as an example of how a shared international military platform can be used as 
a tool to shape and enforce the United States’ foreign agenda. With so many countries 
contributing as partner nations it makes a significant portion of these nations’ defense 
capability dependent on continued membership in the program (Caverley et al., 2019). Not 
only does the F-35 provide significant military capability but also boosts a partner nations’ 
infrastructure and economy by producing component parts. This coupled with the large 
initial purchase price and start-up makes countries who purchase F-35s locked into the 
program (Caverley et al., 2019). The United States can then use this dependence on the F-
35 program to influence foreign actions. The United States used the F-35 program as 
leverage against both Israel and Turkey to prevent the Israelis from selling drone parts to 
China and to convince Turkey to cease the purchase of Russian anti-air missile 
technologies (Caverley et al., 2019). Although Turkey has not agreed to cease the purchase 
of Russian military equipment the threat serves as a potent tool as the manufacture of F-35 
parts is estimated to be a $12 billion industry for Turkey (Caverley et al., 2019). The F-35 
is an example of the benefits of international cooperation in military weapons programs 
and serves as an example for not just future aircraft programs but many other weapon 
systems including warships.  
Based on the previous analysis, the construction of United States warships within 
NATO member nations in Europe would be significantly less expensive than construction 
within the United States. While this does not mean major programs should be shifted 
overseas, opportunities for cost-saving should be explored. It is also clear from our analysis 
that it is less expensive to purchase and use established ship design rather than incurring 
the costs of research, development, test, and evaluation. The financial benefits of adopting 
foreign designs and manufacture are compelling there are also intangible benefits to greater 
collaboration with European NATO member nations. Greater use of joint international 
programs would improve interoperability between NATO partners. This commonality of 
warship platforms would make joint operations easier due to the similarity of 
communication equipment and capability. This interoperability and shared manufacturing 
burden would also lead to a reduction in overall life cycle cost as replacement parts and 
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repair capability overseas would be more available. A shared design adds additional 
benefits of freeing up capacity to conduct in-theater repairs and rapid redeployment of 
assets. Another intangible benefit from utilizing European NATO nations for the 
manufacture of United States warships would be to maximize the greatest core 
competencies of each NATO member state. It cannot be assumed that one nation is the 
most capable of completing all aspects of warship manufacture. Leveraging the strengths 
of NATO member states with core competencies would improve the quality of future 
warships. Collaboration with these member nations could also improve the United States’ 
ability to become more productive and effective.  
While there are persuasive reasons both tangible and intangible to pursue warship 
production within Europe there are also significant reasons to maintain warship production 
within the United States. The loss of GDP and jobs due to shifting warship production 
overseas has been discussed but beyond the monetary loss, there would be a serious loss to 
the United States’ ability to respond to a major conflict if the shipbuilding industry and 
infrastructure were weakened. The limited merchant shipbuilding industry within the 
United States means the major shipbuilding firms within the United States are dependent 
on military contracts to maintain proficiency within their workforce and to remain solvent. 
A shift of production overseas could leave the United States without the industrial complex 
to meet the demand of major conflict with a peer competitor if necessary. Keeping assets 
vital to national security such as the production of nuclear-powered ships domestically 
could reduce this concern of losing all proficiency. There are also compelling reasons to 
incur the cost of RDT&E to maintain a technological edge over both adversaries and allies. 
The F-35 program serves as an example of how partnering and selling next-generation 
military technology with friendly nations creates many of the same benefits as adopting 
partner designs but enables The United States to use these enormously expensive and 
lucrative military programs as diplomatic leverage. By holding the keys to other nations’ 
defense, it forces their cooperation with the United States aims and creates great economic 
opportunity for the United States.  
The United States could save costs by shifting some production of warships and 
United States Navy projects overseas to NATO member states. The best practice would be 
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to embrace further collaboration with NATO members and shift certain manufacturing and 
RDT&E overseas but still maintain a significant portion of manufacturing and design 
within the United States. Leaving the installation of combat systems equipment and other 
classified gear to be done domestically could solve the issue of some of the national 
security concerns. Foreign collaboration would be particularly enticing for smaller 
programs like offshore supply vessels and logistics type ships where the United States does 
not intend to build many ships of each class it would be beneficial to benefit from the cost 
savings of overseas design and manufacture as the need for next-generation technology is 
unnecessary. Programs like the Constellation Class also serve as an example of how the 
United States could purchase foreign design and enhance its capability with United States’ 
combat systems and technology but save cost on the hull design. The development and 
manufacture of major programs particularly at the strategic level should be maintained 
within the United States but sake and manufacture with allies should be stressed to take 




The United States must maintain and support domestic shipbuilding and research 
and development. Next-generation capability is developed and built in the United States 
and must be supported to continue. However, certain realities must also be accepted. The 
United States produces warships at a greater cost than its fellow European NATO member 
states. Both material and labor are more expensive in the United States than in European 
NATO member states. The United States is also less productive and maintains a lower 
capacity to produce warships. This analysis provides reasonable evidence to shift select 
projects of warship production overseas, but this process must be done in a balanced way 
with agreements and programs that maximize the cost-saving benefit of overseas 
production while allowing the United States to continue to lead the way in next-generation 
military assets. The United States can engage in foreign NATO member partnerships while 
building to meet the capacity requirements of an expanded fleet. It is paramount that the 
United States maintain the ability to build ships when needed and the current limited 
shipbuilding capacity means pursuing foreign construction and partnership to meet the 
increased demand for warships. Shifting certain programs overseas would allow the United 
States to meet production expectations and benefit domestic shipyards through sharing of 
best practices and expertise. European shipyards are more productive and produce ships at 
lower costs. The United States should pursue partnerships with European shipyards to 
improve industrial practices and learn how to improve United States shipyard productivity. 
The United States’ goal to increase its fleet to 355 or 500 ships in the coming decades gives 
the U.S. an opportunity to improve warship procurement practices. Greater collaboration 
with NATO member states will not only strengthen the alliance and our ability to operate 
but also save costs for the United States and improve domestic shipbuilding proficiency 
and capacity. The FREMM and Constellation Class serve as an example of potential shared 
effort to maximize cost-saving and enhance NATO capability. The F-35 program also 
serves as an example of how joint international partnerships place the United States at the 
center of global defense and military trade. The United States must shift its focus to great 
power competition and act to maximize the effectiveness of every dollar spent to win a 
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potential near pear competition. This shift in focus must also ensure the alliances that serve 
as the foundation for the established international order remain strong. Further partnership 
with European NATO member states will benefit the United States financially, but, more 
importantly, it will improve the United States’ ability to meet production requirements.  
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